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Abstract
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) often share phenotypes of repetitive behaviors,
possibly underpinned by abnormal decision-making. To compare neural correlates underlying decision-making between these
disorders, brain activation of boys with ASD (N = 24), OCD (N = 20) and typically developing controls (N = 20) during gambling
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was compared, and computational modeling compared performance. Patients were unimpaired on number of risky decisions,
but modeling showed that both patient groups had lower choice consistency and relied less on reinforcement learning
compared to controls. ASD individuals had disorder-speciﬁc choice perseverance abnormalities compared to OCD individuals.
Neurofunctionally, ASD and OCD boys shared dorsolateral/inferior frontal underactivation compared to controls during
decision-making. During outcome anticipation, patients shared underactivation compared to controls in lateral inferior/
orbitofrontal cortex and ventral striatum. During reward receipt, ASD boys had disorder-speciﬁc enhanced activation in
inferior frontal/insular regions relative to OCD boys and controls. Results showed that ASD and OCD individuals shared
decision-making strategies that differed from controls to achieve comparable performance to controls. Patients showed
shared abnormalities in lateral-(orbito)fronto-striatal reward circuitry, but ASD boys had disorder-speciﬁc lateral inferior
frontal/insular overactivation, suggesting that shared and disorder-speciﬁc mechanisms underpin decision-making in these
disorders. Findings provide evidence for shared neurobiological substrates that could serve as possible future biomarkers.
Key words: Autism Spectrum Disorder, computational modeling, decision-making, fMRI, obsessive-compulsive disorder
Introduction
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is characterized by social and
communication difﬁculties and restricted, repetitive behaviors
(American Psychiatric Association 2013) and affects 0.6–2.0% of
the population, with a higher prevalence in males (Blumberg
et al. 2013). Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) is identiﬁed
by recurrent and intrusive distressing thoughts (obsessions)
and repetitive rituals (compulsions) (American Psychiatric
Association 2013) and has a prevalence of 1–3%, with a slightly
higher incidence in males in pediatric samples (Ruscio et al.
2010). These highly heterogeneous and frequently comorbid
disorders can sometimes be clinically difﬁcult to separate, as
symptoms such as repetitive behaviors in ASD can often
resemble OCD-related compulsions (Russell et al. 2005). Such
overlap has been attributed to shared genetic risk and biologi-
cal mechanisms as well as diagnostic mislabelling (Russell
et al. 2016), highlighting a need to understand the distinct and
overlapping underlying neurobiological mechanisms of both
disorders.
Executive functions (EF) are higher-order cognitive functions
important for goal-directed behavior and can be conceptualized
dichotomously as “cool” EF, referring to nonemotional func-
tions including inhibition and working memory, and “hot” EF,
referring to functions with reward-based motivation including
gambling and reward learning (Zelazo and Müller 2007). Cool EF
has been widely investigated in ASD and OCD (for reviews, see
(Zelazo and Müller 2007; van Velzen et al. 2014; Carlisi,
Norman, Lukito et al. 2016; Norman et al. 2016)). However, rela-
tively less is known about the mechanisms underlying reward-
related hot EF processes in these disorders, as evidence to date
has been inconsistent.
Impaired decision-making has been implicated in both ASD
and OCD (Cavedini et al. 2006; Luke et al. 2012). The Iowa
Gambling Task (IGT) (Bechara et al. 1994) has been widely used
in typically developing populations to measure reward-based
decision-making and temporal foresight impairments under
conditions of ambiguity, as it requires reinforcement learning
to distinguish between choices that yield large immediate gains
but even larger losses (risky options) leading to long-term
ﬁnancial losses and decks that give small gains but even smal-
ler losses, leading to long-term ﬁnancial gains at the end of the
game (safe options).
There have been only 5 studies in ASD using the IGT
(Johnson et al. 2006; Yechiam et al. 2010; South et al. 2014;
Mussey et al. 2015; Zhang et al. 2015), showing mixed results.
A relatively consistent ﬁnding in both children/adolescents
(Johnson et al. 2006; Yechiam et al. 2010) and adults
(Mussey et al. 2015) is that ASD individuals shift more fre-
quently between choices, possibly due to difﬁculties with
implicit learning (Johnson et al. 2006) or exploration-focused
learning strategies (Yechiam et al. 2010). Another study in
adults with ASD found that the ASD group had worse perfor-
mance, preferring disadvantageous decks (Zhang et al. 2015).
However, one study (South et al. 2014) in children/adolescents
found superior performance in ASD adolescents relative to typi-
cally developing controls, explained by a “loss-avoidance” style
of decision-making in the ASD group in contrast to a “reward-
seeking” style often observed among typically developing ado-
lescents (Smith et al. 2012).
There have been relatively more studies using the IGT in
adults with OCD (e.g., (Purcell et al. 1998; Cavedini et al. 2002,
2010; Cavallaro et al. 2003; Olley et al. 2007; Starcke et al. 2010;
Rocha et al. 2011; Grassi et al. 2015; Kim et al. 2015)). The major-
ity show impaired decision-making in patients relative to con-
trols, with patients preferring large immediate rewards and not
learning from losses, although there have also been negative
ﬁndings (Nielen et al. 2002; Lawrence et al. 2006; Krishna et al.
2011). Only one study was conducted in children with OCD
using the IGT which found that patients performed worse rela-
tive to controls and that this was related to symptom severity
during the most severe period of illness (Kodaira et al. 2012).
The IGT taps a range of cognitive processes including
reward-related decision-making, reward sensitivity, loss aver-
sion, temporal foresight, inhibitory control (to inhibit the contex-
tual “thrill” of immediate gains), and exploratory behavior. Thus,
to clarify IGT performance impairments (or lack thereof) in both
clinical groups, it is important to investigate these cognitive and
motivational factors on a more nuanced level to better charac-
terize task performance, and computational modeling is a useful
tool for this (Huys et al. 2016).
Similar performance deﬁcits could also be mediated by differ-
ent underlying neurofunctional networks. No functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies, however, have yet
investigated the neural correlates of decision-making under
ambiguity in ASD or OCD using the IGT. In typically developing
individuals, the IGT activates dorsolateral and ventromedial pre-
frontal, orbitofrontal, insular, posterior cingulate, and ventral
striatal regions during the various stages of the decision-making
process (Li et al. 2010). In light of a dearth of evidence in ASD
and OCD speciﬁcally on the IGT, evidence can be compiled from
studies examining related reward-based decision-making pro-
cesses; during tasks of temporal discounting (Chantiluke,
Christakou et al. 2014) and reversal-learning (Chantiluke, Barrett,
Giampietro, Brammer et al. 2015), adolescents with ASD have
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shown abnormalities in related fronto-temporo-limbic systems
mediating executive processes (Carlisi, Norman, Lukito et al.
2016) and ventromedial/fronto-limbic regions important for
reward-related functions, especially those involving monetary
gain/loss (Kohls et al. 2013). OCD has traditionally been concep-
tualized as a disorder of abnormalities in ventral affective sys-
tems including (orbito)fronto-striato-thalamo-cortical networks
as well as in lateral orbitofrontal-striatal systems important for
cognitive/inhibitory control (Zelazo and Müller 2007; Menzies
et al. 2008; Carlisi, Norman, Lukito et al. 2016). fMRI studies
involving reward-related decision-making support evidence for
abnormalities in both motivation control as well as cognitive
control regions by showing that OCD patients relative to controls
have hyperactivity in ventromedial prefrontal, orbitofrontal and
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) regions projecting to ventral stri-
atum and medio-dorsal thalamus, and underactivation in
cortico-striato-thalamic regions including dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (DLPFC), temporal and parietal cortices, and basal ganglia
(Menzies et al. 2008; Brem et al. 2012).
The relative lack of consistent ﬁndings in ASD and OCD on
the IGT highlights a need for a better understanding of neuro-
cognitive phenotypes of reward-based decision-making in these
disorders. Recent efforts such as the Research Domain Criteria
(RDoC; (Insel et al. 2010)) stress the importance of investigating
trans-diagnostic phenotypes which may be underpinned by
shared and/or disorder-speciﬁc neurofunctional mechanisms.
Thus, we compared adolescents with ASD to those with OCD
and typically developing controls to investigate shared and
disorder-speciﬁc brain function abnormalities during the IGT
and compared reinforcement learning models to examine ﬁne-
grained differences in behavioral factors that might underlie
overall decision-making. We hypothesized that both patient
groups would be impaired on some aspect of task performance.
Speciﬁcally, we hypothesized that OCD adolescents would show
increased risky decision-making on the IGT compared to typi-
cally developing controls as evidenced by previous studies
(Starcke et al. 2010; Grassi et al. 2015). Moreover, we hypothe-
sized that OCD boys would show more brain-based impairments
during loss and negative outcome based on the literature in this
patient group of impaired error monitoring (Fitzgerald et al.
2005) and the clinical literature of the prototypical feeling that
things need to be “just right” which often characterizes indivi-
duals with OCD (Coles et al. 2003). For ASD boys, we hypothe-
sized this group would show lower choice consistency compared
to typically developing control participants (Johnson et al. 2006;
Yechiam et al. 2010) and OCD patients. We tested whether dif-
ferences were due to more nuanced shared or disorder-speciﬁc
differences in decision-making styles. Based on evidence from
IGT studies in typically developing individuals showing that
reward-based decision-making may be driven by dorsolateral
and ventromedial/orbitofronto-striato-limbic function (Li et al.
2010; Christakou, Gershman et al. 2013), we hypothesized that
both groups would show abnormalities in these networks
(Christakou et al. 2011; Brem et al. 2012). Furthermore, based on
prior evidence of neurofunctional reward-related deﬁcits in the 2
disorders, we hypothesized that both disorders would show
abnormal reward processing in ventromedial-fronto-temporo-
limbic (Kohls et al. 2013) regions important for reward-based
decision-making and temporal foresight required by the task
(Menzies et al. 2008). However, we also expected disorder-
speciﬁc stronger deﬁcits in OCD in orbitofrontal regions and in
ASD in ventral striatal and anterior cingulate regions based on
respective deﬁcits in these regions observed in each disorder
(Menzies et al. 2008; Kohls et al. 2013).
Materials and Methods
Participants
64 right-handed (Oldﬁeld 1971) boys (20 typically developing
control boys, 24 boys with ASD, 20 boys with OCD), 11–17 years-
old, IQ ≥ 70 (Wechsler 1999) participated. Medication-naïve ASD
boys were recruited from local clinics. Clinical ASD diagnosis
was made by a consultant psychiatrist using ICD-10 research
diagnostic criteria (WHO 1992) and conﬁrmed using the Autism
Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R (Lord et al. 1994)). The
Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS (Lord et al.
1989)) was also completed. All ASD boys reached clinical
thresholds in all domains on the ADI-R (social, communication,
restricted/stereotyped behavior) and ADOS (communication,
social). Parents of ASD boys also completed the Social
Communication Questionnaire (SCQ; (Rutter et al. 2003)) and
the Strengths and Difﬁculties Questionnaire (SDQ; (Goodman
and Scott 1999)). ASD participants had a physical examination
to exclude comorbid medical disorders and any abnormalities
associated with ASD. Individuals with comorbid psychiatric
conditions, including OCD and ADHD, were not included.
OCD boys were recruited from the Maudsley Hospital
National & Specialist OCD clinic. Diagnosis was made by a con-
sultant clinician using ICD-10 criteria and conﬁrmed with the
Children’s Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (CY-BOCS;
(Goodman et al. 1989)) and ancillary symptom checklist.
Parents of OCD boys also completed the SDQ. OCD patients
with comorbid psychiatric or neurological conditions, including
ASD and ADHD, were excluded. Four boys were prescribed sta-
ble doses of antidepressants (see Supplement).
Twenty age- and handedness-matched typically developing
control boys were recruited locally by advertisement. Controls
did not meet clinical thresholds on the SDQ and SCQ for any
disorder and did not have a current or lifetime history of any
psychiatric condition.
Exclusion criteria for all subjects were comorbid psychiatric/
medical disorders affecting brain development (e.g., epilepsy/
psychosis), drug/alcohol dependency, history of head injury,
genetic conditions associated with autism, abnormal structural
MRI scans, and MRI contraindications. Controls also participated
in our fMRI study examining maturation of decision-making on
the IGT, published previously (Christakou, Gershman et al. 2013).
Most ASD and control participants also participated in additional
fMRI tasks during their visit, published elsewhere (Christakou
et al. 2011; Christakou, Murphy et al. 2013; Chantiluke, Barrett
et al. 2014; Murphy et al. 2014; Chantiluke, Barrett, Giampietro,
Brammer et al. 2015; Chantiluke, Barrett, Giampietro, Santosh
et al. 2015; Carlisi, Chantiluke et al. 2016).
This study was conducted in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki. Ethical approval was obtained from the
local Research Ethics Committee (05/Q0706/275). Study details
were explained to participants and guardians. Written, informed
assent/consent was obtained for all participants, and individuals
were compensated for their time and travel expenses.
Iowa Gambling Task
The fMRI version of the IGT used in this study is described in
detail elsewhere (Christakou et al. 2009; Christakou, Gershman
et al. 2013). Brieﬂy, on each of 80 trials, participants were pre-
sented with 4 card decks (A/B/C/D) on a screen and instructed
to choose any deck by pressing the corresponding button with
the right hand on an MR-compatible 5-button response box.
They were instructed to win as much money as possible by the
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end of the task. They were only told that sometimes they
would win money and sometimes they would lose money, and
that some decks might be better than others. They were also
told that their ﬁnal amount won on the task would determine
how much of a maximum £30 they would receive as compensa-
tion (in reality, all subjects received £30).
Decks A and B were termed disadvantageous or “risky”
decks because they returned relatively large gains (£190/£200/
£210) but even larger losses (£240/£250/£260), leading to an
overall net loss, whereas decks C and D were advantageous or
“safe” because they returned small gains (£90/£100/£110) but
even smaller losses (£40/£50/£60), resulting in a net gain. There
was a 50% probability of winning or losing on each deck.
Task performance is summarized by the ratio of advanta-
geous choices to total choices or, the number of cards picked
from decks C + D divided by the total number of cards picked
(A + B + C + D). This ratio is proportional to the “net score”
((C + D) − (A + B)) frequently used when quantifying perfor-
mance on the IGT (Bechara et al. 1994) without giving negative
values. Ratios above 0.5 denote preference for safe relative to ris-
ky decks, while a ratio below 0.5 implies perseveration on risky
choices despite accumulating losses. Responses where reaction
time (RT) was less than 200ms were considered “premature” and
these trials were not included in analyses (Thorpe et al. 1996).
This IGT adaptation differs from other fMRI versions (e.g.,
(Lawrence et al. 2009)) in that choice was temporally separated
from its outcome, haemodynamically decoupling choice and
outcome evaluation, allowing separate examination of each.
Subjects were given 3 s to respond. Following each choice, the
chosen deck was superimposed with a 12-segment wheel tick-
ing down every 0.5 s for a total 6 s until outcome presentation.
If no response was made, the trial progressed directly to a
blank screen for 9 s. Positive (win) and negative (loss) outcomes
were indicated by a happy or sad face presented below the
deck and the amount won or lost indicated on the card (Fig. 1).
Outcomes were presented for 3 s. Trials lasted 15 s, ending with
a blank screen after outcome presentation serving as an
implicit baseline in the fMRI analysis. Omitted trials were
excluded from analyses. The length of each inter-trial interval
(ITI) was determined by the RT, which jittered trial events so as
to maintain a 15 s total trial duration. As these manipulations
lengthened trial and task duration compared to other behav-
ioral variants, this version of the task included 80 trials rather
than the typical 100 trials (Bechara et al. 1994; Lawrence et al.
2009). Total task time was 21min. Before testing, participants
practiced the task in a mock scanner, where 10 test trials pre-
sented equal payoffs across decks.
Computational Modeling
The IGT requires decision-making based on the learned outcomes
of previous choices. Performance on the IGT can be inﬂuenced by
a range of factors including learning rates, reward and loss sensi-
tivity, or inconsistent responding (Ahn et al. 2014). Thus, compu-
tational approaches are especially useful for understanding the
processes underlying IGT performance. We used hierarchical
Bayesian analysis (HBA) implemented within the hBayesDM
R package (https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/hBayesDM/index.
html) for computational modeling of IGT performance (Ahn
et al. 2016). For further details of the methods, rationale and
advantages of HBA over other modeling methods (e.g., maxi-
mum likelihood estimation), see Supplement and (Lee 2011).
HBA involves preparation of trial-by-trial task data for each par-
ticipant, model ﬁtting and comparison of 3 commonly used and
validated models of the IGT: the “Prospect Valence Learning
(PVL)-Decay Reinforcement Learning (RI) model, the PVL-Delta
model and the Value-Plus-Perseverance (VPP)“ model (Worthy,
Pang et al. 2013; Ahn et al. 2014; Steingroever et al. 2014).
The PVL models focus on 4 parameters based on learning
theory: α represents feedback sensitivity, λ represents loss aver-
sion, c represents choice consistency, and A represents learning
rate (how much weight is placed on past experiences of a cho-
sen deck vs. the most recent experience of that deck). These
models are identical except that they use different learning
rules; in the PVL-decayRI rule, expectancies of all decks are dis-
counted on each trial, but in the PVL-Delta rule, only the expec-
tancy of the selected deck is updated.
Based on previous simulation experiments (Worthy, Hawthorne
et al. 2013), the VPP model combines the learning rule of the PVL-
Delta model with the perseverance heuristic of win-stay-lose-
switch choice behavior. This model contains 4 additional perse-
verance parameters: k determines how much the perseverance
strengths of all decks decay on each trial, εp and εn indicate loss/
gain impact, respectively, on choice behavior (i.e., stay/switch
tendency), and ω is the reinforcement learning weight, that is,
the degree on which a subject relies on reinforcement learning
over perseverative strategies. For complete model details, see
Supplementary and (Ahn et al. 2014, 2016).
Model Fitting and Comparison
Posterior inference for all models was performed via Markov
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling implemented in RStan
(http://mc-stan.org/interfaces/rstan). Stan (v2.1.0 (Carpenter et al.
2017)) uses a speciﬁc probabilistic sampler called Hamiltonian
Monte Carlo (HMC) to sample from the posterior distribution. For
details, see (Kruschke 2014; Ahn et al. 2016) and the Stan refer-
ence manual (http://mc-stan.org/documentation/).
Figure 1. Schematic diagram of the IGT (Christakou, Gershman et al. 2013)
Participants were initially “loaned” £2000, indicated by the red bar, and money
won/lost was added to/deducted from this amount, indicated by the current
running total, depicted by the green bar. At the start of each trial, participants
were presented with 4 decks of cards and asked to choose one by pressing with
the right hand one of 4 buttons on an MR-compatible response box. Participants
were given 3 s to make a response, and their choice (reaction time – RT) was fol-
lowed by an anticipation period of 6 s, during which a 12-segment circle was
presented that counted down the 6 s in steps of 0.5 s. Outcome of the decision
(wins = green card, happy face; losses = red card, sad face) was presented for 3 s,
after which a blank screen (inter-trial interval – ITI) was presented for a variable
3 s, determined by the RT, resulting in a total trial duration of 15 s (RT (up to
3 s) + anticipation (6 s) + outcome (3 s) + ITI (3 s or more if RT was less than 3 s) =
15 s).
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hBayesDM enables model-ﬁt assessment and post hoc com-
parison via Widely Applicable Information Criterion (WAIC)
(Watanabe 2010). This index is obtained by computing the
summed point-wise log-likelihood per participant, accounting
for the fact that in the IGT, choices on a given trial are depen-
dent on previous choices (Gelman et al. 2014). Smaller WAIC
scores denote better model-ﬁt, and overall ﬁt is assessed by
adding WAIC scores from each group for each model.
Statistical Analysis
All analyses were conducted in JASP (v0.8.1.1;https://jasp-stats.
org/) using Bayesian analysis based on posterior probabilities
rather than frequentist p-values, which rely on the sampling
intentions of the investigator. Models were favored if BF10 > 10,
indicating strong evidence for the tested model over the null
hypothesis. In instances where BF10 was sufﬁciently large (>1000),
Log(BF10) is reported, where values >1 indicate strong evidence
for the model. For clarity, where appropriate, we also report null
hypothesis signiﬁcance test (NHST) results, including P-values.
ANOVAs tested for group differences in demographic and
questionnaire measures, and in task performance. Group differ-
ences in mean parameter estimates were assessed by each
parameter’s highest density interval (HDI), i.e., the range of
parameter values that spans 95% of the distribution in a pair-
wise comparison (Ahn et al. 2014). A parameter was considered
to signiﬁcantly differ between groups if the HDI did not overlap 0.
Nonparametric correlations (Kendall’s Tau rank coefﬁcients)
were conducted to test for associations between task perfor-
mance, symptoms and brain activation.
fMRI Acquisition
Gradient echo echo-planar magnetic resonance imaging data
were acquired on a GE Signa 3-Tesla scanner (General Electric,
Waukesha WI) at the Centre for Neuroimaging Sciences, King’s
College London, using a semi-automated image quality-control
procedure (Simmons et al. 1999). A quadrature birdcage head
coil was used for radiofrequency transmission and reception.
In each of 22 noncontiguous planes, we acquired 800 T2*-
weighted images depicting blood oxygenation-level dependent
(BOLD) response covering the whole-brain (echo time (TE) =
30ms, repetition time (TR) = 1.5 s, ﬂip angle=60°, in-plane reso-
lution = 3.75mm, slice thickness = 5.0mm, slice skip =
0.5mm). A whole-brain high-resolution structural image with
43 slices was also acquired (TE = 40ms, TR = 3 s, ﬂip angle=90°,
slice thickness, 3.0mm, slice skip = 0.3mm).
fMRI Data Analysis
fMRI data were analysed using a nonparametric permutation-
based software developed at the Institute of Psychiatry,
Psychology and Neuroscience (XBAM v4.1; http://brainmap.co.
uk) which avoids issues such as false positives that are related
to parametric statistical analyses (Eklund et al. 2016). In con-
trast to normal theory-based inference, this approach mini-
mizes assumptions and uses median rather than mean-based
statistics to control for outlier effects. Its most commonly used
test statistic is computed by standardizing for individual differ-
ences in residual noise before performing second-level multi-
subject testing using robust permutation-based methods. This
allows a mixed-effects approach to analysis that has been
recommended following analysis of the validity and impact of
theory-based inference in fMRI (Thirion et al. 2007). Details of
individual and group-level analyses are described elsewhere
(Christakou et al. 2009) and in the Supplement.
Brieﬂy, fMRI data were realigned to minimize motion-related
artefacts and smoothed with a Gaussian ﬁlter (full-width at half-
maximum 8.82mm) (Bullmore et al. 1999). Time-series analysis of
individual subject activation was performed with wavelet-based
resampling described in (Bullmore et al. 2001). We ﬁrst convolved
the task epoch of each event of interest (choice, anticipation, out-
come) with 2 Poisson model functions (4 and 8 s delays). Using
rigid-body and afﬁne transformation, individual maps were regis-
tered into Talairach space (Talairach and Tournoux 1988). Group
maps were then produced for each experimental condition, and
hypothesis testing was performed using cluster-level analysis,
shown to give excellent cluster-wise type-I error control (Bullmore
et al. 2001). Time-series permutation was used to compute the dis-
tribution of the statistic of interest under the null hypothesis. The
voxel-level threshold was set to 0.05 to give maximum sensitivity
and to avoid type-II errors. Then, a cluster-mass threshold was
computed from the distribution of cluster masses in the wavelet-
permuted data such that the ﬁnal expected number of Type-I
error clusters under the null hypothesis was less than one per
whole-brain. Given that brain activation changes with age during
development (Rubia et al. 2010, 2013), and hence to control for
possible effects of nonsigniﬁcant group differences in age, age
was included as a covariate of no interest in the fMRI analyses.
However, because groups did not differ in age, analyses were
repeated to conﬁrm that inclusion of this covariate did not signiﬁ-
cantly affect results.
To more speciﬁcally focus on areas implicated in the IGT and
reward/punishment processing (Li et al. 2010), additional analyses
were conducted using a region of interest (ROI) approach based on
a priori hypotheses. Search space was restricted to a single mask
comprising bilateral orbitofrontal cortex, medial frontal gyrus,
inferior frontal gyrus (opercularis), inferior frontal gyrus (triangu-
laris), insula, putamen, caudate, and nucleus accumbens. Regions
were extracted from the Harvard-Oxford atlas using FSL (Smith
et al. 2004), nonlinearly converted from Montreal Neurological
Institute (MNI) coordinates into Talairach coordinates using the
MNI2TAL program (http://imaging.mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk/imaging/
MniTalairach) and combined in XBAM. Within the mask, <1 false-
positive cluster was expected with thresholds of P < 0.05 for voxel
and P < 0.03 for cluster comparisons.
Results
Participant Characteristics
Groups did not differ in age or IQ (Table 1). As expected, groups
differed on SDQ total and sub-scores. Post hoc tests correcting
for multiple comparisons showed that all groups differed on
SDQ total-scores (all Log(BF10) > 3, P < 0.001). ASD boys were
more impaired on peer, prosocial and hyperactivity/inattention
subscales compared to typically developing controls and OCD
boys (all Log(BF10) > 4, P < 0.001), who did not differ. On the con-
duct sub-scale, ASD boys differed from controls only (Log(BF10) =
2.64, P < 0.003). On the emotion sub-scale, controls differed from
ASD and OCD boys (both Log(BF10) > 7, P < 0.001), who did not
differ from each other.
Performance Data
Groups did not differ on their preference ratio for safe decks
across the entire task (BF10 = 0.16, F(2,63) = 0.65, P = 0.53) or in
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group-by-block (4 blocks of 20 trials each) interaction analysis
(BF10 = 0.01, F(2,62) = 0.35, P = 0.71), with strong evidence in favor
of the null hypothesis (BF01 = 219.05). Task performance is fur-
ther summarized in Supplementary Figures S1 and S2.
Movement
Groups did not signiﬁcantly differ on minimum (BF10 = 0.13,
F(2,63) = 0.03, P = 0.97), maximum (BF10 = 0.36, F(2,63) = 1.37, P =
0.26) or mean (BF10 = 0.19, F(2,63) = 0.49, P = 0.61) head-
translation in 3D-Euclidian space.
Model Comparison
We ﬁrst tested which model provided the best ﬁt for the data
by comparing WAIC scores (Supplementary Table S1), with
lower WAIC scores indicating better model-ﬁts. Results sug-
gested that the VPP model (WAICtotal = 11387.78) provided the
best model-ﬁt relative to the other 2 models (PVL-DecayRI
WAICtotal = 12502.34; PVL-Delta WAICtotal = 12812.60) in all
3 groups, consistent with previous studies (Worthy, Pang et al.
2013; Ahn et al. 2014).
We used the winning VPP model to compare parameter esti-
mates among groups (Table 2). Typically developing controls
showed greater choice sensitivity (c) compared to ASD (95% HDI
from 0.83 to 4.54, mean of HDI = 2.69; t(20.4) = 32.93, P < 0.001)
and OCD boys (95% HDI from 1.44 to 4.22, mean of HDI = 2.83;
t(19.2) = 34.19, P < 0.001). Controls also showed higher rein-
forcement learning weights (ω) than ASD (95% HDI from 0.46 to
0.98, mean of HDI = 0.72; t(23.6) = 26.13, P < 0.001) and OCD
boys (95% HDI from 0.45 to 0.97, mean of HDI = 0.71; t(20.2) =
39.96, P < 0.001). ASD boys showed greater perseverance decay
rates (k) compared to controls (95% HDI from −0.44 to −0.06,
mean of HDI = −0.25; t(33.8) = −5.21, P < 0.001) and OCD boys
(95% HDI from 0.005 to 0.47, mean of HDI = 0.24; t(42) = 3.75, P =
0.001). A complete table of differential distributions is pre-
sented in Supplementary Table S2.
Group Maps of Brain Activation
Images of within-group brain activation for choice (risky vs.
safe), anticipation, and outcome (win vs. loss) phases are pre-
sented in Supplementary Figure S3.
Group Effect-Choice
Whole-brain analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) including age as
a covariate compared brain activation during the choice phase
(risky vs. safe choices) and showed a main effect of group in
left DLPFC extending into superior frontal gyrus (Table 3A;
Fig. 2A). Post hoc comparisons revealed that this was due to
controls activating this region more during risky choices relative
to both ASD (BF10 = 82.98, P < 0.001) and OCD subjects (BF10 =
13.97, P = 0.02).
When the search space was constrained to the fronto-
striatal ROIs, controls had increased activation to risky choices
relative to ASD (BF10 = 2.83, P = 0.03) and OCD (BF10 = 7.89, P =
0.005) boys in right IFG/insula (Table 3A; Fig. 2B). No group dif-
ferences were observed in any of the other ROIs.
Excluding the 4 medicated OCD boys from analyses had no
effect on the main ﬁndings.
Group Effect-Anticipation
Whole-brain ANCOVA comparing brain activation during out-
come anticipation showed a group-effect in 2 regions: left IFG/
insula/inferior temporal lobe and left pre/postcentral gyrus
extending into PCC. This was due to shared underactivation
in both regions in ASD (left IFG/insula/inferior temporal
lobe: BF10 = 164.47, P = 0.003; pre/postcentral gyrus/PCC: BF10 =
5.25, P = 0.05) and OCD boys (left IFG/insula/inferior temporal lobe:
Table 1 Participant characteristics
Variables TDC (N = 20)
Mean (SD)
ASD (N = 24)
Mean (SD)






Age (years) 15.1 (2.0) 14.6 (1.6) 15.7 (1.4) 2.7 (2,61) 0.08 −0.03
IQ 119.7 (11.9) 113.1 (14.3) 117.7 (13.4) 1.4 (2,61) 0.25 −0.99
SCQ total score (t-test) 2.2 (2.3) 16.5 (7.4) — 8.3 (42) <0.001 17.26
SDQ total score 5.0 (3.9) 19.5 (6.8) 12.5 (5.6) 36.2 (2,61) <0.001 19.03
SDQ emotional distress 0.7 (1.7) 4.3 (2.8) 4.4 (2.6) 14.6 (2,61) <0.001 7.88
SDQ conduct 0.9 (1.3) 2.6 (2.2) 1.9 (1.5) 5.6 (2,61) 0.006 2.07
SDQ peer relations 1.6 (2.5) 6.5 (2.4) 3.3 (3.0) 19.8 (2,61) <0.001 11.05
SDQ hyperactive impulsive/
inattentive
2.2 (1.9) 6.2 (2.4) 3.0 (2.7) 17.9 (2,61) <0.001 9.96
SDQ prosocial behavior 8.6 (2.4) 4.5 (2.4) 7.7 (2.6) 17.4 (2,61) <0.001 9.68
ADOS communication score — 3.6 (1.2) — — —
ADOS social interaction score — 9.0 (2.3) — — —
ADOS communication+social — 12.7 (3.1) — — —
ADOS stereotypy score — 1.5 (1.5) — — —
ADI communication score — 16.6 (4.7) — — —
ADI social interaction score — 20.0 (5.3) — — —
ADI repetitive behavior score — 6.5 (2.4) — — —
CY-BOCS total score — — 22.3 (5.8) — —
CY-BOCS–obsessions — — 10.8 (3.6) — —
CY-BOCS–compulsions — — 12.0 (3.1) — —
Abbreviations: ADI, Autism Diagnostic Interview; ADOS, Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule; ASD, Autism Spectrum Disorder; CY-BOCS, Childrens’ Yale-Brown
Obsessive-Compulsive Symptom Checklist; DF, degrees of freedom; SD, standard deviation; SDQ, Strengths and Difﬁculties Questionnaire. TDC, typically developing
controls. Note, Log(BF10) is reported for Bayesian analyses, as BF10 values were consistently high.
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BF10 = 8.29, P = 0.04; pre/postcentral gyrus/PCC: BF10 = 55.60, P =
0.002) relative to typically developing controls (Table 3B; Fig. 2C).
ROI analysis revealed 2 clusters that signiﬁcantly differed
among groups, one of which was observed in the whole-brain
analysis (see above): left IFG/insula, extending in the ROI analysis
into VLPFC/OFC, and in right ventral striatum (VS), including
nucleus accumbens, caudate and putamen. Post hoc comparisons
showed shared reduction in both clusters in ASD (IFG/insula/OFC:
BF10 = 79.65, P = 0.002; VS: BF10 = 101.61, P = 0.004) and OCD (IFG/
insula/OFC: BF10 = 7.82, P = 0.04; VS: BF10 = 122.07, P < 0.001) boys
versus typically developing controls (Table 3B; Fig. 2D).
When the 4 medicated OCD boys were excluded from analy-
ses, all group-difference clusters remained, but the difference
in the right VS cluster from the ROI analysis was observed only
at a reduced threshold of P = 0.07 in patients relative to
controls.
Group Effect-Outcome
Whole-brain analyses comparing activation differences during
outcome presentation showed no effect of group when wins
versus losses were contrasted. However, ROI analysis revealed
a group effect in the left IFG/insula, which was due to ASD boys
having disorder-speciﬁc enhanced activation to wins relative to
typically developing controls (BF10 = 237.61, P < 0.001) and OCD
boys (BF10 = 31.60, P = 0.003), who had more activation in this
region to losses relative to ASD boys (Table 3C; Fig. 2E).
Excluding the 4 medicated OCD boys had no effect on the main
ﬁndings. Moreover, when all analyses were repeated excluding
age as a covariate, results remained largely unchanged.
Associations Between Symptom Measures and Task
Performance/Brain Activation
After correction for multiple comparisons, there was no rela-
tionship between symptom measures and any parameter esti-
mate or overall advantageous preference ratio in the ASD or
OCD group. There was no statistically signiﬁcant correlation
between symptom measures and brain activation among ASD
or OCD boys.
Associations Between Task Performance and Brain
Activation
In the control group, higher advantageous preference ratios
were associated with increased activation to risky versus safe
choices in left DLFPC (r = 0.43, BF10 = 7.99, P = 0.007), and with
increased activation during outcome anticipation in left IFG (r =
0.45, BF10 = 11.12, P = 0.005).
Table 2 Parameter estimates from the VPP model
Parameter TDC (N = 20)
Mean (SD)
ASD (N = 24)
Mean (SD)
OCD (N = 20)
Mean (SD)
Learning rate (A) 0.01 (0.01) 0.44 (0.22) 0.24 (0.15)
Feedback sensitivity (α) 0.14 (0.06) 0.61 (0.13) 0.96 (0.43)
Choice sensitivity (c) 3.16 (0.33) 0.72 (0.07) 0.66 (0.02)
Loss aversion (λ) 0.22 (0.08) 4.70 (1.65) 4.91 (2.27)
Loss impact (εp) −1.38 (0.87) −1.69 (2.97) −1.80 (1.16)
Gain impact (εn) −0.84 (1.33) −0.76 (2.75) −1.07 (2.16)
Perseverance decay rate (k) 0.42 (0.08) 0.63 (0.17) 0.44 (0.16)
Reinforcement learning weight (ω) 0.94 (0.01) 0.25 (0.13) 0.26 (0.08)
Abbreviations: ASD, Autism Spectrum Disorder; SD, standard deviation; TDC, typically developing controls; VPP, value-plus-perseverance.
Table 3 ANCOVA results of brain activation differences between typically developing control boys, boys with ASD, and boys with OCD
Contrast Regions of activation Brodmann areas Peak Talairach coordinates (x, y, z) Voxels Cluster P-value
(A) Choice (risky-safe)
Whole-brain
TDC > ASD,OCD L DLPFC, superior frontal gyrus 6/8/9/46 −33,4,64 302 0.004
ROI
ASD,OCD > TDC R IFG, insula 45 36,22,4 51 0.009
(B) Anticipation (vs. baseline)
Whole-brain
TDC > ASD,OCD L IFG, insula, inferior temporal 47 −40,26,−7 198 0.01
TDC > ASD,OCD L pre/postcentral, PCC 6 −36,−15,26 225 0.01
ROI
TDC > ASD,OCD L IFG, insula, VLPFC, OFC 47 −40,26,−13 83 0.006





ASD > C,OCD L IFG/insula 45/47 −33,30,−13 39 0.02
Abbreviations: ASD, Autism Spectrum Disorder; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; L, left; OFC, orbitofrontal cortex; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex; ROI, region of interest;
TDC, typically developing controls; VLPFC, ventrolateral prefrontal cortex; VS, ventral striatum. BOLD regions = cluster-peak.
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Parameter estimates or overall performance were not asso-
ciated with brain activation in ASD or OCD boys.
Discussion
This is the ﬁrst study to investigate the underlying neural corre-
lates of IGT performance both in ASD and OCD and the ﬁrst study
to compare the 2 disorders in fMRI during decision-making.
Individuals with ASD and OCD shared differences in decision-
making strategies with regard to decreased choice consistency and
reliance on reinforcement learning compared to controls, in order
to achieve overall similar task performance compared to typically
developing boys. Furthermore, ASD and OCD boys showed shared
neurofunctional underactivation relative to controls during
decision-making in left dorsolateral prefrontal and right inferior
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Figure 2. Between-group differences in brain activation between control boys, boys with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and boys with OCD. Analysis of variance
(ANOVA) showing the main effect of group on brain activation for the 3 phases of the IGT. (A) Whole-brain results of the group effect during decision-making (choice
phase, safe vs. risky), (B) Region of interest (ROI) results of the group effect during decision-making (choice phase, safe vs. risky), (C) Whole-brain results of the group
effect during outcome anticipation, (D) ROI results of the group effect during outcome anticipation, (E) ROI results of the group effect during outcome presentation
(win vs. loss). Talairach z-coordinates are shown for slice distance (in mm) from the intercommissural line. The right side of the image corresponds with the right
side of the brain. * indicates signiﬁcance at the P < 0.05 level, ** indicates signiﬁcance at the P < 0.01 level, *** indicates signiﬁcance at the P < 0.001 level.
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regions and PCC during outcome anticipation. During outcome
presentation, however, ROI analyses showed that ASD boys had
disorder-speciﬁc enhanced activation to wins versus losses in a
left inferior fronto-insular region relative to OCD boys and controls.
The computational modeling results suggest that, despite
overall comparable performance to typically developing controls,
ASD and OCD boys used shared decision-making strategies that
differed from controls to achieve this performance. OCD and ASD
participants were less consistent in their choices, in line with
previous evidence of increased switching behavior on the IGT in
ASD adolescents (Johnson et al. 2006; Yechiam et al. 2010) that
may relate to underlying difﬁculties with implicit learning and
cognitive ﬂexibility (Johnson et al. 2006; Solomon et al. 2015). The
present work extends this evidence to OCD, suggesting that
increased exploration (independent of outcome sensitivity) may
be a shared trans-diagnostic behavioral phenotype of decision-
making. Moreover, the ﬁnding of lower reinforcement learning
weights in both patient groups compared to typically developing
controls suggests that ASD and OCD individuals less effectively
implemented reversal-learning strategies to maximize outcomes
and instead used a different strategy (e.g., exploration), in line
with impaired reward learning in OCD (Nielen et al. 2009) and
ASD (Scott-Van Zeeland et al. 2010). Taken together, this suggests
that patients may achieve performance similar to controls via
enhanced exploration and less reliance on learning from experi-
enced outcomes. Moreover, perseverance strengths decayed at a
faster rate in the ASD group compared to the OCD and control
groups, in line with evidence that ASD individuals have a ten-
dency to switch decks more frequently (Johnson et al. 2006). This
effect may be dissociable from the disorder-shared decreased
choice consistency that was also observed in OCD, as choices on
previous decks have less inﬂuence on future choices, regardless
of reward/punishment valuation on a given deck.
Whole-brain fMRI analysis results showed that both patient
groups shared reduced activation in left DLPFC during decision-
making relative to typically developing controls, and these results
were extended to the right IFG/insula in ROI analyses. Lateral PFC
is important for value representation (Ridderinkhof et al. 2004),
and more speciﬁcally, DLPFC has been implicated in working
memory, important for incorporating known information during
decision deliberation (Li et al. 2010). DLPFC activation during
decision-making under ambiguity has consistently been observed
in typically developing populations (Krain et al. 2006). Moreover,
ventrolateral prefrontal regions and the insula are related to emo-
tional attribute of decision options and are part of a proposed
“saliency network” implicated in stimulus signiﬁcance and affec-
tive response (Phillips et al. 2003). IGT performance and neural
representation of decision values in dorso- and ventrolateral PFC
mature with age, suggesting development of a decision-making
network incorporating action values with executive processes
(Christakou, Gershman et al. 2013). Thus, the present ﬁndings
could imply abnormalities in the functional maturation of these
regions in ASD and OCD. Furthermore, enhanced activation in
left DLPFC to risky versus safe decks was related to better
performance in controls, whereas this relationship was not
observed in ASD or OCD individuals. Given the DLPFC’s role in
integrating memory representations with goal-directed behavior
(Ridderinkhof et al. 2004), this may suggest that ASD and OCD
individuals have neurofunctional deﬁcits in updating reward
expectation. Moreover, in ASD, reduced DLPFC activation has been
found during reversal-learning, suggesting that abnormalities in
this region may relate to problems in ﬂexibly updating choice
behavior due to abnormalities with implicit learning that may also
inﬂuence choice consistency on the IGT (D’Cruz et al. 2016).
Whole-brain results showed that both patient groups relative
to typically developing controls had reduced activation in left
OFC/VLPFC/IFG/insula during outcome anticipation. These results
were conﬁrmed as well as extended to right BG/VS in ROI analy-
ses. This is in line with evidence in OCD of decreased lateral orbi-
tofrontal activation during outcome presentation on a reversal-
learning task (Remijnse et al. 2006; Chamberlain et al. 2008) and
reward anticipation (Jung et al. 2011) and extends this evidence to
ASD. In OCD, OFC deﬁcits have been linked to impaired reward-
related learning and to an inability to detect changes in reinforce-
ment contingencies (Menzies et al. 2008), and the present ﬁndings
suggest that this phenotype may be shared with ASD, in line with
evidence in ASD of fronto-limbic abnormalities during reward
gain/loss, independent of valence (Kohls et al. 2013). Moreover,
cognitive inﬂexibility has been associated with OCD, affecting
goal-directed decision-making and learning (Gillan and Robbins
2014). A previous study found that OCD adolescents had reduced
left IFG activation compared to controls during set-shifting
(Britton et al. 2010). Moreover, a study of reward reversal-learning
found that ASD adults had reduced VS as well as left DLFPC and
parietal activation compared to controls (D’Cruz et al. 2016), in
line with our ﬁndings of disorder-shared reduced activation in
these regions, implicating these areas in a range of reward-
related processes that may be affected in both ASD and OCD.
The basal ganglia, and more speciﬁcally the caudate and VS,
have been consistently implicated in reward expectation and
value representation (Dichter, Damiano et al. 2012). This region is
particularly relevant to OCD given the prominence of fronto-
striatal networks in the neurofunctional characterization of the
disorder (Menzies et al. 2008). ROI ﬁndings of disorder-shared
blunted VS response during reward anticipation are in line with
previous ﬁndings of similar underactive VS response during
ambiguous reward anticipation in ASD (Dichter, Felder et al.
2012; Kohls et al. 2013; D’Cruz et al. 2016) and OCD (Menzies et al.
2008; Figee et al. 2011) as well as depression (Smoski et al. 2009)
and schizophrenia (Juckel et al. 2006), suggesting the possibility
of a shared neurobiology among a range of disorders with regard
to fronto-striatal under-responsiveness to anticipated reward.
ROI analyses revealed that ASD boys had disorder-speciﬁc
increased activation in left IFG/insula to positive (wins) versus
negative (losses) feedback relative to OCD boys and typically
developing controls, who both had more activation to loss in this
region. Some studies have found insula hyperactivation during
reward in ASD (Cascio et al. 2012; Dichter, Richey et al. 2012), and
another found enhanced left frontal activation in ASD individuals
during rewarded outcomes (Schmitz et al. 2008), implying that
reward-related left frontal systems are enhanced in ASD (Cascio
et al. 2012). This is in line with the insula’s role in interoceptive
awareness as part of the proposed “saliency network” (Critchley
et al. 2004; Menon and Uddin 2010), suggested to be affected in
ASD individuals (Uddin and Menon 2009), and suggests that simi-
lar systems are intact in OCD patients during reward processing.
This study has several limitations. While psychiatric comorbid-
ity was an exclusion criterion, we cannot discard the possibility
that subthreshold symptoms of other disorders were present
in our sample. Moreover, ASD participants were not assessed
using OCD-speciﬁc measures, e.g., CY-BOCS, (and vice-versa).
Nonetheless, thorough clinical assessment of ASD and OCD parti-
cipants and inclusion of mostly medication-naïve patients are
study strengths, and absence of comorbidity was conﬁrmed by a
consultant psychiatrist in all cases. Four OCD boys were prescribed
SSRIs. Although there is evidence for neurofunctional effects of
serotonin during decision-making (Murphy et al. 2008), results
largely remained when medication was accounted for, although
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the right VS cluster was seen only at a reduced threshold, suggest-
ing a possibility that medication may have inﬂuenced brain activa-
tion during reward anticipation in this region. However, it is more
likely that this secondary analysis was underpowered. Moreover,
we found no association between symptom severity and perfor-
mance measures, which is possibly due to patient/symptom het-
erogeneity in our clinical groups. However, it is also possible that,
while fMRI analyses were adequately powered to detect neurobio-
logical differences (Thirion et al. 2007), correlation analyses may
have been underpowered to detect behavioral associations, and
behavioral analyses may have been underpowered to detect effects
on the somewhat simplistic measure of advantageous preference
ratio. Future studies should aim to also assess trans-diagnostic,
trait-based measures that may more accurately capture individual
differences or cognitive/behavioral subtypes within each disorder.
The aim of this study was to compare as a ﬁrst step relatively
“pure” cases of disorders to understand disorder-speciﬁc abnor-
malities. However, given the common co-occurrence between
ASD and OCD, future studies should investigate to what extent
the comorbid presentation of ASD and OCD differs from the pure
disorders to elucidate the underlying neural mechanisms underly-
ing this overlap and co-occurrence. Understanding the neurobiol-
ogy of the comorbid condition and whether related neural
dysfunction resembles brain dysfunction typical of ASD or of OCD
independently would also be very relevant for treatment. In line
with a recent study comparing these groups during temporal dis-
counting (Carlisi et al. 2017), another “hot” EF task, there were pre-
dominantly shared neurofunctional abnormalities between ASD
and OCD. However, another recent study comparing these groups
during sustained attention, a “cool” EF task, found predominantly
OCD-speciﬁc abnormalities that were not observed in ASD boys
compared to controls (Carlisi, Norman, Murphy et al. 2016). The
main aim of comparing different diagnostic groups with fMRI is to
identify shared and different underlying neurobiological sub-
strates that could be targeted in interventions (e.g., pharmacologi-
cal, behavioral, neurofeedback). If we are able to understand the
ﬁne-grained cognitive and neurofunctional mechanisms driving
differences and similarities between ASD and OCD patients and
typically developing adolescents, and if the ﬁndings are replicated
across future studies and across a wider range of tasks, this could
potentially have implications for ﬁndings of disorder-speciﬁc bio-
markers that could be targeted in differential treatments for the 2
disorders. Therefore, the present ﬁndings suggest that diagnostic
differentiation may not map on to neurobiological differentiation
in the context of “hot” EF and that treatments could exploit the
neurofunctional abnormalities that are shared in these disorders.
For example, brain stimulation or fMRI neurofeedback studies
could target regions such as the dmPFC that are involved in “hot”
EF and implicated in both disorders. In line with this, it is interest-
ing to note that SSRIs are often used in the treatment of indivi-
duals with ASD and with OCD (Soomro et al. 2008; Benvenuto
et al. 2013), providing further support for shared biological mecha-
nisms underpinning speciﬁc aspects of these disorders that may
have treatment implications. However, such theories should be
empirically tested, and these 2 different diagnostic groups should
be compared to a comorbid group to elucidate the underlying neu-
rofunctional substrates of the co-occurring presentation that
would be important for the development of neuroscience-based
treatment for psychiatric disorders.
Conclusions
This ﬁrst behavioral and fMRI comparison of ASD and OCD ado-
lescents on the IGT showed that ASD and OCD patients used
different decision-making strategies relative to typically develop-
ing controls in that they were less consistent in their choices and
relied less on reinforcement learning to achieve overall perfor-
mance comparable to controls. ASD adolescents, moreover, had
distinctive perseverative task performance in that they showed
higher perseverance decay rates compared to OCD and typically
developing boys. This was underpinned by predominantly
shared neurofunctional deﬁcits relative to typically developing
controls in dorsal and ventral prefrontal regions during decision-
making and in orbitofrontal-ventral striatal regions during
reward and loss processing, as shown by both whole-brain and
ROI analyses. ASD patients, however, had disorder-speciﬁc
enhanced inferior frontal/insular activation to reward feedback
in the ROI analysis, suggesting a possible neurofunctional signa-
ture of reward-based decision-making on the IGT that may be
unique to ASD. This study provides novel insight into underlying
neurobiological and behavioral mechanisms that shed light on
trans-diagnostic phenotypes of reward learning and decision-
making in the 2 disorders that may drive respective clinical char-
acteristics of executive impairments in each disorder.
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